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Colonel Garland H. Williams, Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict 
Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005, 317 
pp., £12.95 pbk.).  
 
In view of ongoing events in Iraq, Colonel Garland H. Williams’ analysis of the 
military’s role in the post-conflict reconstruction of war-torn territories is a seminal 
work that should be read by anyone interested in the study of civil-military relations 
within peace missions. His well-argued, well-researched analysis offers the reader new 
conceptual ideas on what continues to be ‘one of the most challenging aspects of the 
international response to conflict and disaster’ (p. 32). 
His study is motivated by the conviction that ‘there are better ways to conduct 
post-conflict reconstruction […] or the cost, not only in money but also in human lives, 
will continue to escalate’ (p. 117). This conclusion is shaped by twenty-two years of 
military experience on security operations around the world, and in-depth knowledge of 
the complementary abilities of military and civilian agencies. Colonel Williams is 
particularly concerned by the ‘reconstruction gap’ (p. 10) that tends to develop during 
the first year after the cessation of hostilities. Among the reasons leading to this gap, he 
includes the precarious state of local physical infrastructure after the end of the fighting; 
the often limited (or non-existent) local capacity to resolve this situation; the inadequate 
planning and slow deployment of international civilian-led financial assistance and 
personnel for infrastructure purposes; and the military’s reluctance to embark on nation 
building tasks. The ‘reconstruction gap’ results in an ambiguous situation where the 
lack of basic infrastructure precludes setting in motion essential processes of economic 
and social recovery, and institution building, for the promotion of long-term peace in 
the war-torn territory.  
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To resolve this impasse he proposes a role for the US military that combines its 
primary task of providing security and stability with a wider reconstruction mandate for 
physical infrastructure. Furthermore, the American military engineering and 
construction battalions accompanying peacekeeping contingents should execute this 
role. Colonel Williams’ starting point is that the latter are the only actors in theatre 
‘uniquely positioned and equipped to take on such postconflict reconstruction tasks 
immediately’ (p. 6). Nevertheless, despite this fact, the use of US military engineering 
capabilities has so far been essentially limited to the improvement and repair of that 
physical infrastructure that served a military purpose, such as enabling mobility to and 
from base camp in areas with damaged, destroyed and mined bridges, highways and 
roads. In those exceptional cases where military engineering expertise went beyond this 
limit, the American engineers involved were acting on their own initiative.  
Colonel Williams’ proposals might appear, at first glance, too forward-looking for 
an institution that considers involvement in nation building as ‘mission creep’ (p. 84). 
However, as rightly pointed out in the foreword to this book by Richard H. Solomon, 
President of the United States Institute of Peace, it is a qualified proposal, only meant to 
cover the immediate post-conflict phase until international and local civilian agencies 
can take over. The prime objective is to ensure a rapid, well-planned normalisation of 
the war-torn territory and therefore, a fast and efficient exit strategy for a strained US 
military.  
The last chapter of this book is arguably the most important from a policy 
standpoint. On the basis of the lessons he draws from the US interventions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan, Colonel Williams designs a four-stage 
‘Postconflict Reconstruction Template’ (p. 217) to be applied in future US peace 
operations by an inter-agency civil-military working group and operations centre. This 
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template emphasises the need for clarity of mission, unity of authority and integration of 
effort, and the importance of timely political decisions and international commitment.  
Colonel Williams acknowledges the limitations of his template, including the 
fact that ultimately domestic forces, rather than external intervention, are the critical 
determinants of successful peacebuilding and sustainable recovery. However, he argues 
against reconstructing the war-torn territory to its pre-war state because, in cases like 
Afghanistan, it would not provide the local authorities with the capacity to ensure long-
term growth. He therefore recommends aiming for a ‘higher starting point’ (p. 246), 
without taking into account the possibility that the war-torn territory may not have the 
necessary resources to sustain anything above pre-war levels without becoming 
dependent on international aid.  
This book would have also benefited from a more detailed account of how 
Colonel Williams’ template relates to other non-US military and civilian actors 
deployed in the field as part of peace missions, or how the ‘reconstruction gap’ could be 
closed in situations that fall short of the ‘relative calm that exists immediately after the 
cessation of hostilities’ (p. 226). Notwithstanding these comments, this book represents 
an important contribution to the growing literature on the post-conflict reconstruction of 
war-torn territories.  
Gemma Collantes-Celador is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Institut 
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